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Physician·assisted suicide: the last bridge to 
active voluntary euthanasia 
YALE KAMISAR 
SOME 30 YEARS AGO an eminent constitutional law scholar, Charles L. 
Black, Jr, spoke of 'toiling uphill against that heaviest of all argumental 
weights- the weight of a slogan. ' 1 I am reminded of that observation when I 
confront the slogan the 'right to die.' 
THE 'RIGHT TO DIE' 
Few rallying cries or slogans are more appealing and seductive than the 'right 
to die.' But few are more fuzzy, more misleading, or more misunderstood. 
The phrase has been used loosely by many people to embrace at least four 
different rights: 
I the right to reject or to terminate unwanted medical procedures, 
including life-saving treatment; 
2 the right to commit suicide or, as some call it, the right to 'rational' suicide; 
3 the right to assisted suicide, that is, the right to obtain another's help in 
committing suicide; and 
4 the right to active voluntary euthanasia, that is, the right to authorize 
another to kill you intentionally and directly. 
Each of these four 'rights' should be kept separate and distinct. Unfortunately, 
many times they are not. 
First of all, neither the 1976 Quinlan case2 nor the 1990 Cruzan case3 (the 
only case involving death, dying and the 'right to privacy' ever decided by the 
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US Supreme Court) establishes an absolute or general right to die- a right to 
end one's life in any manner one sees fit. The only right or liberty that the 
Quinlan Court established and the Cruzan Court recognized is the right 
under certain circumstances to refuse or to reject life-sustaining medical 
treatment or, as many have called it, the right to die a natural death. 
Indeed, the Quinlan case explicitly distinguished between letting die on the 
one hand, and both direct killing and assisted suicide on the other.4 No less 
prominent an advocate of assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia 
than the Hemlock Society's Derek Humphry recognizes that the Quinlan case 
'is significant,' inter alia, for 'distinguishing between suicide and the passive 
withdrawal of life supports.'5 
As did Quinlan, the Cruzan case, the one 'right to die' case that rivals 
Quinlan for prominence, involved the right to end artificial life support. 6 
Cruzan, too, provides small comfort to proponents of a constitutional right 
to assisted suicide. 
In Cruzan, a 5-4 majority, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, 'assumed for 
purposes of this case' that a competent person has 'a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.' 7 But the Court 
declined to call the liberty a 'fundamental right,' a characterization that 
requires a state to provide a compelling justification before restricting it. 
Instead, the Court called the right 'a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.' 8 
By avoiding 'fundamental right' language, the Court, it seems, would 
permit a state to restrict the 'liberty interest' in terminating unwanted 
life-sustaining medical treatment upon a lesser showing of need than would 
have been required if the interest had been deemed 'fundamental.' 'Any 
reasonable state interest' might suffice.9 In any event the Cruzan Court did 
not assume or even suggest that one has so much as a 'Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest' in assisted suicide. Quite the contrary. The 
Court asserted that a state has an undeniable interest 'in the protection and 
preservation of human life' and supported this assertion by noting: 
[T]he majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties 
on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is 
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision 
by a physically able adult to starve to death. 10 
I share the view that the language quoted above amounts to an endorsement 
of laws prohibiting assisted suicide (and laws permitting state intervention to 
prevent suicide).11 
Cruzan is not the only Supreme Court case on which proponents of a right 
to assisted suicide rely. They also find support for their views in the Court's 
abortion cases.12 In Roe v. Wade, 13 the Court informed us that 'a right of 
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privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,' which had earlier 
been invoked to invalidate restrictions on the use of contraceptives, 'is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.'14 The Court cleared the way for its ultimate holding by rejecting 
the state's argument that 'a fetus is a person' within the meaning of the 
Constitution- 'the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
does not include the unborn.'15 
Although Roe did not concern the termination of a human life, as the Court 
perceived the matter, the case has been read very broadly to support a 'right' 
or 'liberty' to commit suicide and to enlist the assistance of others in doing 
so.16 So far as I am aware, however, no one who has read Roe this broadly has 
taken into account that later in the same Term the Court rejected the notion 
that 'our Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving 
consenting adults only is always beyond state regulation.'17 It is noted at this 
point that '[t]he state statute books are replete with constitutionally 
unchallenged laws against prostitution, suicide ... and duels, although 
these crimes may only directly involve "consenting adults.'' ' 18 
The Court must have meant assisted suicide, not suicide, for two reasons: 
(r) suicide itself does not involve consenting adults; and (2) at the time the 
Court made this observation there were no state laws against suicide, but 
there were many criminalizing assisted suicide. 
A plausible argument may be made that the 'right of privacy' which 
protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, at least in its early 
stages, includes the 'right' or 'liberty' of a person, at least one terminally ill, to 
make the choice whether to continue to live until death comes naturally or to 
hasten death by the use of 'physician-prescribed medications.' 19 But a much 
more persuasive argument may be made, I believe, that the 'right of privacy' 
invoked in Roe encompasses the autonomy of sexual activity and relationships. 
As Justice Blackmun wrote in a much-publicized consensual sodomy case, 
'[s]exual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central 
to ... the development of human personality"'; 'individuals define themselves 
in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others' 
and 'much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an 
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal 
bonds.'20 But Justice Blackmun wrote in dissent. 
A majority of the Court in that case, Bowers v. Hardwick, upheld the 
challenged ban against consensual sodomy as applied to homosexuals even 
though the activity took place in private. Roe and other 'right of privacy' 
cases were explained away on the ground that they involved family, marriage, 
procreation, contraception and abortion. '[A]ny claim that these cases ... 
stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between 
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consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription IS 
unsupportable.'21 
Robert Sedler, a well-known law professor and one of the lawyers 
challenging the constitutionality of Michigan's prohibition against assisted 
suicide, maintains that 'the essence of the "liberty" protected by the due 
process clause is personal autonomy' which, he contends, encompasses a 
person's right 'to control his or her own body, and to define his or her own 
existence' (which, he claims, includes the right to end one's existence in 
accordance with one's principles).22 How does or can Professor Sedler 
reconcile his views with Bowers v. Hardwick, which rejected a similar 
argument in the context of sexual activities and relationships? A sphere of 
conduct like that at issue in Hardwick seems much closer to marriage, 
procreation, the use of contraceptives and abortion than the right to assisted 
suicide. Sedler does not attempt to reconcile his views with Bowers v. 
Hardwick. He ignores the case entirely. 
COMPARING AND CONTRASTING SUICIDE, ASSISTED 
SUICIDE AND ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
The right to active voluntary euthanasia 
In recent decades we have witnessed a good deal of change in attitudes toward 
death and dying, especially 'letting die.' But it is no less true today than it ever 
was that active voluntary euthanasia (sometimes called 'consensual homicide') 
is murder. Although there has long been a high incidence of failures to indict 
and jury nullification in these cases/3 the law on the books in every state is 
clear: If one intentionally and actively kills another, neither the fact that he 
did so at the deceased's request nor the fact that the defendant was motivated 
by 'mercy' excuses the homicide. One cannot waive one's right not to be killed. 24 
To be sure, some commentators have forcefully argued that one should be 
able to waive one's right not to be killed, at least where the person is 
competent and makes an 'informed' decision that continued existence is no 
longer desirable or sensible under the circumstances.25 But to date no 
American legislature nor any American court has accepted this argument in 
the context of active voluntary euthanasia. 
The right to assisted suicide 
Assisted suicide falls somewhere between the termination of life support and 
active voluntary euthanasia. (More about just where it falls later.) Active 
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voluntary euthanasia occurs when a person other than the one who dies 
performs the last act - the one that actually brings about death. Assisted 
suicide takes place when another person provides assistance but the suicidant 
commits the last act herself. Although the two practices differ with respect to 
who performs the 'last act,' they are similar in that each involves the active 
intervention of another person to promote or to bring about death. 
As the Cruzan Court noted, assisted suicide (although less widely 
condemned than active voluntary euthanasia) is a crime in a majority of 
American states. Most of the states that prohibit assisted suicide do so by 
specific legislation, while some treat it as a form of murder or manslaughter. 26 
Suicide, attempted suicide and assisted suicide 
It is often said that since there is a 'right' to commit suicide it follows that 
there is a right to assisted suicide as well. But I do not think if fitting or proper 
to speak of a right to commit suicide. 
Although one usually has the capacity to commit suicide, one does not have 
the right to do so. The fact that we no longer punish suicide or attempted 
suicide does not mean that we approve of these acts or that we recognize that 
an individual's right to 'self-determination' or 'personal autonomy' extends 
this far. 
The decriminalization of both suicide and attempted suicide did not come 
about because suicide was deemed a 'human right' or even because it was no 
longer considered objectionable. Rather, it occurred because punishment was 
seen as unfair to innocent relatives of the suicide and because those who 
committed or attempted to commit the act were thought to be prompted by 
mental illness.27 However, the judgment that there is no form of criminal 
punishment that is acceptable for a completed suicide and that criminal 
punishment is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts to commit suicide 
does not mean that there is a 'right' to commit the act. Much less does it mean 
that one has a justifiable claim to assistance in committing the act. 28 
That criminal punishment was thought to have no deterrent effect on 
would-be suicides does not mean it would be ineffective in the case of 
someone considering assisting another to commit suicide. And there is good 
reason to invoke the criminal law in the latter case: '[T]he interests in the 
sanctity of life' represented by the prohibition against criminal homicide 
would seem to be 'threatened by one who expresses a willingness to 
participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be 
accomplished with the consent, or at the request of, the suicide victim.' 29 
This, at least, was the judgment of the eminent scholars who drafted the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (hereinafter the Code) in the 
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1950s and 1960s. The Code is considered 'the principal text in criminal law 
teaching, the point of departure for criminal law scholarship, and the greatest 
single influence on the many new state codes that have followed in its wake.'30 
Although it criminalizes neither suicide nor attempted suicide, it does make 
aiding or soliciting another to commit suicide a felony. 31 
The Code's reporters considered the argument that in certain cases the 
criminality of assisted suicide should turn upon 'the presence of a selfish 
motive' - a position advanced by one of its special consultants, Glanville 
Williams, a renowned British commentator and a leading proponent of 
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. In the end, however, the reporters 
concluded that 'the wiser course' in these cases 'is to maintain the prohibition 
and rely on mitigation in the sentence when the ground for it appears.'32 
Recently, a proponent of physician-assisted suicide asked: 'How should 
the law respond when a physician or other person helps an individual do 
something that is legal in every state, when that legal activity is suicide?'33 It 
may be good advocacy to frame the question this way, but to do so strikes me 
as quite misleading. 
As already pointed out, the reasons that led to the decriminalization of 
suicide and attempted suicide do not apply when one person 'helps' another 
to commit suicide. Although there may be 'a certain moral extravagance in 
imposing criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own 
self-destruction [and] who more properly requires medical or psychiatric 
attention,'34 self-destruction 'is still a harm to be avoided, not a right to be 
encouraged.'35 That is why, despite the fact that suicide itself is no longer a 
crime, 'helping' another commit suicide - if 'help' means 'intentionally 
providing the physical means' or 'intentionally participat[ing] in a physical 
act' by which that other person dies by suicide36 - remains a crime in most states. 
WOULD A NARROW EXCEPTION TO CURRENT CRIMINAL 
PROHIBITIONS REMAIN A NARROW EXCEPTION FOR 
VERY LONG? 
Assisted suicide versus active voluntary euthanasia 
Consider the following cases: A competent patient who has clearly made 
known her wish to die accomplishes her purpose by swallowing a lethal dose 
of medication which her physician has (a) placed under her pillow or on the 
night table next to her bed; (b) placed in her hand; (c) put in her mouth. How 
should we characterize these cases? 
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 231 
It is fairly clear that (a) constitutes assisted suicide, but what of cases (b) 
and (c)? I would say that (b) is also a case of assisted suicide because the lethal 
process has not yet become irreversible. The patient still has a choice - she 
could change her mind before putting the medication in her mouth and 
swallowing it. I think case (c) is a very close call, but even here one could 
argue that this, too, is an act of assisted suicide - if the patient is able to 
remove the substance from her mouth or spit it out, but instead chooses to 
swallow it. If so, then even here, one could argue, the patient still retains the 
final choice. 
Lawrence Gostin, the Editor-in-Chief of the journal of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics, would disagree with me. He would say that both (b) and (c) should be 
classified as active euthanasia because in both cases the physician did not 
merely take part in the events leading up to the commission of the suicide but 
'active[ly] participat[ ed] in an overt act directly causing death.'37 (But if this 
can be said of the physician who puts a lethal dose of medication in a patient's 
hand, why can it not also be said of the doctor who places the medication 
within a patient's easy reach?) 
Whether one agrees with Gostin or me does not matter very much. What 
does matter, I think, is that the distinctions among these closely related acts 
are so fine that reasonable people (if I may include myself in that group) 
cannot agree on which side they fall. 38 
If so, how can these distinctions be defended on principle or maintained in 
practice? Once we cross the line between the termination of life support and 
the active intervention of another to promote or to bring about death, how 
can we - and why should we - stop short of active voluntary euthanasia? 
One who turns to the literature on the law and morality of assisted dying 
soon discovers that the line between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia 
is often blurred and sometimes completely obliterated. Voluntary euthanasia 
'has been variously described as "assisted suicide"' and suicide has sometimes 
been called 'self-administered euthanasia.'3~ According to one leading writer 
on the subject, active voluntary euthanasia is 'a form of suicide' and the case 
for voluntary euthanasia 'depends upon the case for the righteousness of 
suicide.'40 Another commentator similarly maintains that 'the permissibility 
of euthanasia follows from the permissibility of suicide. '41 Still another 
considers voluntary euthanasia 'essentially a form of suicide involving the 
assistance of others.'42 
The fine distinction between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia -
who performs the 'last act' - was badly smudged by the hard-fought 
campaigns in the states of Washington (1991) and California (1992) to 
legalize physician 'aid-in-dying' - a label covering both assisted suicide and 
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active voluntary euthanasia.43 I followed both campaigns very closely and 
came away with the impression that many members of the media and general 
public either did not understand the distinction between the two practices or 
did not accept it. 
Derek Humphry, the founder of the Hemlock Society, has probably 
written more about the general subject than anyone else, and his books have 
undoubtedly been read by more people than any others in the field. He uses 
the terms suicide, assisted suicide, euthanasia and self-deliverance quite 
loosely and almost interchangeably. 
In a recent book, Dying with Dignity, Humphry tells his readers that he 
had 'no knowledge or interest in euthanasia' until he helped his first wife die 
by furnishing her 'a lethal potion of drugs with which she could end her life at 
a time chosen by her.'44 Thirty pages later he describes this incident as a 
personal 'euthanasia experience.'45 At another point he tells us that 'justifiable 
suicide' is 'rational and planned self-deliverance' or 'autoeuthanasia.'46 Some 
ninety pages later he recalls that before the advent of Hemlock 'active 
voluntary euthanasia (also known as self-deliverance and autoeuthanasia) 
was a taboo subject in America.'47 In a chapter on 'Euthanasia for the Elite,' 
he maintains that 'euthanasia is already widely available to the elite,' because 
'[w]ell off or well connected people often have medical friends who, in secret, 
will pass out lethal drugs or actually make the injection.'48 
Some, no doubt, would dismiss Derek Humphry as a 'popularizer.' But 
then they must deal with the eminent lawyer-philosopher, Ronald Dworkin. 
On the opening page of his new book, Life's Dominion, Professor Dworkin 
observes: 
The argument over euthanasia has suddenly exploded into front-page news. 
Doctors are now beginning openly to admit what the profession once kept 
secret: that doctors sometimes kill patients who ask to die, or help such 
patients to kill themselves. 49 
Then, to illustrate his point that euthanasia 'has provoked intense 
controversy' not only in the Netherlands but in America and elsewhere, 
Dworkin discusses two cases. The first involves a New York physician who 
'prescribed lethal drugs for a leukemia patient and told her how many she 
should take to die.' The second involves a British doctor who 'injected 
potassium chloride [a drug that has no analgesic effect] into a rheumatoid 
arthritis patient ... begging to be killed.' 50 Some r8o pages later, Professor 
Dworkin discusses the British case again. He then turns to what he calls 'a 
similar case'- the aforementioned New York case. 5 1 I think it fair to say that 
the fact that the British doctor performed active euthanasia and that the 
American doctor only helped his patient commit suicide (and, arguably, 
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provided a relatively low level of assistance at that) 52 does not interest 
Dworkin. What does seem to bother him is that the British doctor was 
convicted of attempted murder while the American doctor, who was involved 
in 'a similar case,' was not even prosecuted. 
Even if one believes (as Dworkin, Humphry and others evidently do not) 
that there is an important distinction between assisted suicide and active 
voluntary euthanasia in principle, it will be extremely difficult to contain that 
principle in any subsequent litigation or to adhere to the distinction in practice. 
If a patient's inability to commit suicide 'for either physiological or 
psychological reasons' entitles her under certain circumstances to the active 
intervention of another person in order to bring about her death,53 why 
should not a patient's inability- despite preliminary assistance- to perform 
the last death-causing act, for either physiological or psychological reasons, 
entitle her to active voluntary euthanasia? If assisted suicide is appropriate 
when patients 'need more help from the physician than merely abating 
treatment, but less help than would be required if they were asking the 
physician to kill them,'54 why is not active voluntary euthanasia appropriate 
when less help than 'killing them' would not suffice, when patients are unable 
to perform the ultimate act and thus nothing less than 'killing them' is 
required to 'help' them die an 'easy' death? 
Suppose a patient is unable to swallow the pills that will bring about her 
death or is otherwise too weak to perform the last act that will fulfill her 
persistent wish to die. If there is or ought to be a right to assisted suicide, how 
can it be denied to such a person simply because she lacks the physical 
capacity to perform the final act by herself? 
Dr Timothy Quill, who helped a long-standing patient die by suicide, does 
believe in drawing a line between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia,S5 
but even he has a difficult time adhering to that line. Quill tells, approvingly, a 
'moving story' about a physician who prescribed barbiturates to a patient in 
an advanced stage of AIDS but who did not 'abandon his patient' when this 
help proved inadequate: 
The patient wanted to take the barbiturates he had saved for an overdose, but 
was too weak to feed them to himself. Faced with this moment of truth, the 
doctor helped his patient swallow the pills. 56 
Can (should) the right to assisted suicide be confined to the 
terminally ill? To those suffering unbearable pain? 
One can understand an argument without accepting it. I understand the basic 
argument for assisted suicide (and perhaps active voluntary euthanasia as 
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well): Life has value only so long as it has meaning for the person whose life it 
is and respect for 'self-determination' and 'personal autonomy' should entitle 
a competent person to decide for herself whether, when and how she chooses 
to end her life. If this argument is convincing, however, I have great difficulty 
understanding why the 'right' or 'liberty' to assisted suicide should be limited 
to the 'terminally ill' and/or those suffering unbearable pain. 
If one is trying to establish a right to assisted suicide it is good tactics to 
frame the issue narrowly - to speak, for example, only of a right to assisted 
suicide for the terminally ill. Thus, lawyers for the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) have challenged the constitutionality of Michigan's ban on 
assisted suicide insofar as it prohibits terminally ill patients from committing 
suicide by making use of physician-prescribed medications. 57 But is there any 
principled way to so limit the right? If either autonomy or the merciful 
termination of an unendurable existence is the basis for this right, why limit it 
to the terminally ill? 
First of all, 'there is, in fact, no consensus on what is a "terminal 
condition." '58 For example, although many states still define such a condition 
as one that will shortly result in death regardless of the utilization of available 
medical treatment, several states have recently adopted provisions defining 
the condition as one that will soon cause death in the absence of medical 
intervention.59 Even if we could all agree on a definition of 'terminal 
condition,' however, 'under a variety of circumstances life may be unendurable 
to a reasonable person, even though he does not face the prospect of 
immediate and painful death. '60 
Timothy Quill, one of the most eloquent proponents of physician-assisted 
suicide, would limit the right in various ways, but he would not confine it to 
the terminally ill. The patient must have a condition, he tells us, 'that is 
incurable and associated with severe, unrelenting suffering.'61 Dr Quill does 
'not want to arbitrarily exclude persons with incurable, but not imminently 
terminal progressive illness, such as ALS (motoneurone disease) or multiple 
sclerosis. '62 But is it any less arbitrary to exclude the quadriplegic? The victim 
of a paralytic stroke? A person afflicted with severe arthritis? 
If personal autonomy and the termination of suffering are the key factors 
fueling the right to assisted suicide, why exclude those with non-terminal 
illnesses or disabilities who might have to endure greater 'unbearable 
suffering' for much longer periods of time than those who are likely to die in 
the near future? Why does not a person who must continue to live what she 
considers an unendurable existence for ten or twenty more years have an 
equal- or even greater -claim or.. the liberty interest in assisted suicide than 
those with terminal conditions?63 
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In an effort to distinguish the terminally ill from all others who might seek 
death by suicide, Professor Sedler maintains that 'the state cannot assert any 
valid interest' in requiring a terminally ill person to wait untifdeath comes 
naturally because 'there can be no valid interest in "preserving life" when 
there is no "life left to preserve." '64 I really do not understand this argument. 
Surely, Sedler is not saying that one who is terminally ill is no longer a 
'person' or a 'human being'? Such a person may have a number of months to 
live (a common definition of terminal illness is six months or less to live) and 
her mental powers can hardly be substantially impaired if she 'chooses' to die 
by suicide. For the present, at least, Sedler and his confreres are not 
contending that persons who are no longer competent should have a right to 
assisted suicide. Thus, if they prevail, and their ground rules are adopted, 
assisted suicide could take place only if the person seeking such a death 
retains sufficient decision-making capacity to exercise a voluntary, competent 
choice. How can it be said that such a person has 'no "life left to preserve"'? 
Of course, such a person may feel or honestly believe that her life is not a 
'life' worth preserving. But so too may many others who suffer from 
debilitating illnesses or severe disabilities, but who are not terminally ill. 
As I understand the position of those advocating a constitutional right to 
assisted suicide, one should have the same right to enlist the aid of others in 
dying by suicide as one presently has to refuse or to withdraw life-sustaining 
medical treatment. 65 .If so, it is fairly clear that once established the right to 
assisted suicide would not be restricted to the terminally ill. For, as 
demonstrated by the Elizabeth Bouvia case and other decisions involving 
quadriplegics who apparently had long life expectancies, the right to refuse or 
to reject medical treatment has not been so limited.66 (Nor, for that matter, 
has it been limited to the presently competent.) 
Another restriction often placed on the right to assisted suicide is that the 
person asserting this right must be experiencing 'intractable pain' or 
undergoing 'unbearable suffering.' At first blush this appears to be a small, 
easily identifiable group. But a closer look reveals this is not so. 
First of all, although 'pain' and 'suffering' are often lumped together, the 
two classifications are not identical. 'Not all pain leads to suffering (the pain 
of the victorious distance runner leads to pleasure), nor does suffering require 
the presence of physical pain (the anguish of knowing one has Alzheimer's 
disease).' 67 
If 'pain and suffering' means or includes physical pain, experts in the field 
maintain that, although pain is admittedly notoriously undertreated in 
America,'" 'almost all terminally ill patients can experience adequate relief 
with currently available treatment.'69 Thus a renowned pain control expert, 
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the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center's Kathleen Foley, reports: 
We frequently see patients referred to our Pain Clinic who have considered 
suicide as an option, or who request physician-assisted suicide because of 
uncontrolled pain. We commonly see such ideation and request dissolve with 
adequate control of pain and other symptoms, using combinations of 
pharmacologic, neurosurgical, anesthetic or psychological approaches/" 
To be sure, '[d]ying patients often undergo substantial psychological 
suffering that is not fully or even principally the result of physical pain. ' 71 But 
suffering 'has no objective correlation with a patient's (medical) condition'72 
-it is 'variable from person to person' and 'externally unverifiable.'73 
If a right to assisted suicide were established, how could this right be denied 
an otherwise qualified candidate who says her pain or suffering is 'unbearable'? 
As a practical matter, would we not defer to the patient's own assessment of 
her pain or suffering? As a matter of principle, shouldn't we? 
So long as a person is competent and her desire to enlist the aid of others in 
dying by suicide is firm and persistent, why should her 'right' to end her life in 
the manner she chooses (if such a right exists) be denied because her ~ondition 
does not satisfy someone else's standard of suffering? 
Once a right to assisted suicide is established, any requirement that the 
patient experience intolerable suffering will probably turn on the patient's 
own view of her suffering- or drop out entirely. In a sense, the requirement 
has already dropped out. The Washington and California proposals to 
legalize 'physician aid-in-dying' required only that a 'qualified patient' be 
afflicted with a terminal illness and express an enduring request for physician 
intervention. Of course, such a patient need not be suffering from a painful 
terminal illness or, if she is, might be receiving analgesic medications that, 
even by the patient's own admission, adequately relieve her physical pain. 
As ethicist Albert Jonsen recently observed, the language of legislative 
proposals, such as those defeated in Washington and in California, is strong 
evidence that 'fear of uncontrolled pain' (and, I would add, 'unbearable 
suffering') 
is no longer a major feature of the justifying arguments [for 'aid-in-dying']. 
Autonomy, not pain or its merciful alleviation, is the principal and even sole 
justifying argument offered by modern proponents. Opponents who argue, as 
in the Washington and California campaigns, that modern methods of pain 
control can virtually eliminate the category of 'intractable' pain are correct 
enough, but they miss the mark: the right to choose death, not the presence of 
pain, is now the issue. 74 
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THE NEED FOR A COURT TO CONSIDER THE BROAD 
IMPLICATIONS OF A 'NARROW' RIGHT TO ASSISTED 
SUICIDE FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL 
237 
Professor Sedler tells us that the constitutional challenge he and his ACLU 
colleagues have mounted against Michigan's anti-assisted suicide law is 
'specific and narrow' - whether the la~ is invalid insofar as it prohibits the 
terminally ill from obtaining medication~ from physicians that will enable 
them . to commit suicide - and that the. 'COurts should address only this 
particular issue/5 Indeed, he goes so far as .to say that the kind of 'slippery 
slope' arguments I have made have 'no place' in constitutional litigation and 
cannot be utilized 'to avoid' facing and confronting the specific question he 
and his colleague have framed. 76 
I could not disagree with him more. I do not believe a court can responsibly 
face and confront the 'narrow' issue presented without considering the 
general implications of the asserted right - without taking into account the 
'slippery slope' arguments I have made (if one wants to call them that). 
I have contended that drawing a line b~ween the terminally ill and other 
seriously ill or disabled persons (who may have to endure more pain and 
suffering for a much longer period of time) is neither sensible nor principled. I 
have maintained, too, that the same may be said for drawing a line between 
assisted suicide (for those who need some assistance from a physician) and 
active voluntary eutha11asia (for those who need a physician to perform the 
last, death-causing act). Is a judge supposed to put on blinders and forge 
straight ahead without thinking about the consequences and ramifications of 
her 'narrow' and 'specific' holding? Is this the way we are supposed to go 
about resolving constitutional issues? 
As the three justices who played the decisive role in reaffirming Roe v. 
Wade observed: 
Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which 
appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts 
may not. We must justify the lines we draw.77 -
An eminent constitutional law professor, Herbert Wechsler, has felicitously 
spelled out this important point: 
[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be 
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate 
result that is achieved. To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the 
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case they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate 
neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by 
others that the principles imply?78 
Professor Sedler is unable to find any 'principled difference' in the 
applicable constitutional doctrine between 'the right of a terminally ill 
person' to withhold or to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment and the 
right of such a person to enlist the aid of a physician in committing suicide. 79 
It is now fairly clear, however, that the fact that a person may be kept alive for 
many years (for example, a respirator-dependent quadriplegic whose mental 
powers are unimpaired) is not a sufficient reason to deny her the right or 
liberty to terminate life support. 80 Why, then, if a right to assisted suicide 
exists for the terminally ill, should it be denied to those who may be kept alive 
for many years? Whatever the answer, is it not appropriate for a judge to 
consider this question before deciding whether there is a right to assisted 
suicide for the terminally ill? 
In arguing that there is a right to personal autonomy that encompasses the 
right to assisted suicide, Professor Sedler and his colleagues rely very heavily 
on the US Supreme Court's abortion cases. Physician-assisted suicide was 
not, of course, the issue before the Court in any of those cases. If it is 
appropriate to transcend the 'narrow' and 'specific' issue presented in a case 
once it is decided, and to dwell instead - and to build on - its broad 
implications, why is it improper to anticipate the implications of a soon-to-be 
decided case and to call the court's attention to them? 
That a proponent of the right to assisted suicide would speak only of- and 
wish the courts to think only about- such a right for the terminally ill is quite 
understandable. Such a narrowly circumscribed claim causes less alarm and 
commands more general support than does a broader right to assisted suicide. 
And, as Justice Frankfurter once observed, 'the function of an advocate is to 
seduce.'81 
But the function of a court is to resist seduction, to rest its judgment on a 
principle of general significance that may be consistently applied, and to 
produce an intellectually coherent reason for a result which in like cases will 
produce a like result. If so, how can a conscientious judge avoid considering 
what other fact situations not presently before the court are (or are not) like 
cases? If I may quote Justice Frankfurter a second time: 
I am aware that we must decide the case before us and not some other case. But 
that does not mean that a case is dissociated from the past and unrelated to the 
future. We must decide this case with due regard for what went before and no 
less regard for what may come after. 81 
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Robert Sedler is part constitutional law commentator and part constitutional 
litigator. In his first article on the subject Sedler-the-litigator appeared to 
dominate- he refused to consider whether a right to assisted suicide would or 
should extend beyond terminally ill persons. But in a more recent article, 
Sedler-the-commentator seems to have come to the fore- this time Professor 
Sedler does address the issue. He concludes that the right would and should 
be available not only to those who have 'no life left to preserve' (his 
characterization of the terminally ill), but to some who do have 'life left to 
preserve' (for example, the person debilitated by multiple sclerosis who may 
live for several additional years).83 Comments Sedler: 
The claim of the multiple sclerosis victim that for him life has become 
unendurable, like the claim of the terminally ill person seeking to hasten 
inevitable death, is objectively reasonable ... [S]ince the multiple sclerosis 
victim is helpless to bring about his own death, a ban on physician assistance 
to enable him to die so is obviously an undue burden on his right to end an 
unendurable life. 84 
Is Sedler's claim that there is or ought to be a right to assisted suicide for the 
terminally ill at bottom only one aspect of a claim that there is or ought to be 
such a right for any competent adult whose wish to die by suicide is 
'objectively reasonable'? If so, why stop with the victim of multiple sclerosis? 
As already pointed out, there are all sorts of reasons why life may seem 
intolerable to a reasonable person.85 'To argue that suicide is rational to 
escape physical pain [or, I would add, to end a physically debilitated life], but 
not suicide for any other reason, is to show oneself out of touch with the 
depth and complexity of human motives.' 86 Moreover, all sorts of seriously ill 
or severely disabled persons may have an 'objectively reasonable' wish to die, 
though they may be physically or psychologically unable to bring about their 
own deaths. They, too, may need someone else to perform the 'last act.' 
How do we go about determining whether a competent person's firm 
conclusion that life has become 'intolerable' is 'objectively reasonable'? Do 
we turn to the writings of philosophers (many of whom are in disagreement 
on this point)? Do we conduct opinion polls? 
Moreover, if self-determination or personal autonomy is the major force 
driving the right to assisted suicide, why should a competent person's firm 
conclusion that life has become unendurable for her have to be 'objectively 
reasonable'? Why should not a competent person's own evaluation of her 
situation suffice? 
I think it noteworthy that when a Michigan trial judge recently held that 
there is a constitutional right to assisted suicide- so far as I am aware, the first 
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American court squarely ever to do so - he drew a line neither (a) between 
terminally ill people seeking to die by suicide and others wishing to do so nor 
(b) between those experiencing severe 'pain and suffering' and others whose 
pain and suffering was, or could be brought, under control. It is to this 
decision that I now turn. 
THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 
In February 1993, shortly after the number of people Jack Kevorkian had 
helped to commit suicide had risen to fifteen, the Michigan legislature passed 
a law making assisted suicide a felony, punishable by up to four years in 
prison. The new law prohibits one with knowledge that another person 
intends to commit suicide from 'intentionally providing the physical means' 
by which that other person does so or from 'intentionally participat[ing] in a 
physical act' by which she does so. 87 
The law contains a number of exceptions. It recognizes the right to reject 
unwanted medical treatment, even life-sustaining procedures, by specifically 
excluding 'withholding or withdrawing medical treatment' from its coverage. 
It also recognizes the principle of 'double effect' -that there is a significant 
distinction between the intended effects of one's actions and the unintended 
though foreseen effects. It does so by exempting 'prescribing, dispensing or 
administering' medication or treatment designed 'to relieve pain or discomfort 
and not to cause death, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or 
increase the risk of death.' (Of course, if the medication administered were 
designed to cause death, at the patient's request, it would be a case of active 
voluntary euthanasia.) 
These provisions led a prominent authority on legal issues in medicine, 
George Annas, to say that, given its exceptions, the Michigan law was likely 
to withstand constitutional challenge. 88 I would have put it even more 
strongly. But before the year was out, in People v. Kevorkian, Wayne County 
Circuit Judge Richard Kaufman ruled that the law violated the constitutionally 
protected 'right' or 'liberty' to assisted suicide.89 
According to Judge Kaufman, (a) under certain conditions a competent 
adult has a right to commit 'rational' suicide and (b) a total ban against 
assisted suicide 'unduly burdens' this right. 90 Although the right is limited, it 
is not confined to the 'terminally ill.' Nor does it require unendurable 'pain 
and suffering.' Indeed, Judge Kaufman made no effort to distinguish between 
those experiencing intolerable pain and suffering and those whose pain or 
suffering was, or could be brought, under control. 
The key factor, according to Judge Kaufman, is the presence or absence of 
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'an objective medical condition' that is 'extremely unlikely to improve.' If a 
person's quality of life is significantly impaired by such a medical condition, 
even though it is not a life-threatening condition (presumably blindness, the 
loss of a hand or permanent paralysis of a part of the body), and her decision 
is made without undue influence, she may avail herself of the newly 
discovered right. But if a person's quality of life is significantly diminished for 
any other reason (for example, disgrace, financial ruin, the loss of one's entire 
family in an airplane crash), she may not invoke the right- no matter how 
competent she is or how firm and persistent her desire to die. 
Many in the media reported that Judge Kaufman had drawn a line between 
'rational' assisted suicide (which a state cannot prohibit} and the 'irrational' 
kind (which a state may prevent). But this is not quite accurate. At one point 
in his opinion, Judge Kaufman did express the view that 'if an adequate, 
meaningful line can be drawn between rational and irrational suicide, the 
liberty provision of the Due Process Clause protects a person's decision to 
commit rational suicide.'91 But the line he ultimately drew is not a line 
between 'rational' and 'irrational' suicide. Rather, it is a line between one 
category of 'rational' suicide- would-be suicides whose lives are significantly 
impaired by irreversible medical conditions - and other categories of 
'rational' suicide. 
Judge Kaufman did not say that a suicide by one whose life is substantially 
impaired by a medical condition constitutes the only form of 'rational' 
suicide. He concluded, however, that such suicides are the only ones that may 
safely be afforded constitutional protection. 
This is the line that must be drawn, Judge Kaufman told us, 'since any form 
of rational suicide that did not include the presence of an objective medical 
condition would be too close to irrational suicide. ' 92 If constitutional 
protection were extended to all persons who have a rational wish to die 'the 
possibility that irrational suicide would increase is too great.'93 Thus, the 
state may prohibit not only 'irrational' suicide and assisted suicide, but some 
classes of 'rational' suicide and assisted suicide as well - those 'where no 
objective medical condition is present.' 
In his extensive discussion of the 'rationality' of suicide, Judge Kaufman 
relied heavily on the writings of Alfred Alvarez (an historian of attitudes 
toward suicide) and Richard Brandt (a prominent American philosopher). So 
far as I can tell, however, neither commentator would draw the line where 
Judge Kaufman did. For example, in a passage that Judge Kaufman quotes 
with apparent approval, Professor Brandt observes: 
If we look over a list of the problems that bother people, and some of which 
various writers have regarded as good and sufficient reasons for ending life, 
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one finds (in addition to serious illness) things like the following: some event 
which has made one feel ashamed or has cost one loss of prestige and status; 
reduction to poverty as compared with former affluence; the loss of a limb or 
physical beauty; the loss of sexual capacity; some event which makes it seem 
impossible that one will achieve things by which one sets store; loss of a loved 
one; disappointment in love; the infirmities of increasing age. It is not to be 
denied that such things can be serious blows to one's prospects ofhappiness.94 
After discussing the views of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the Old 
Testament and early Christian doctrine, Judge Kaufman concludes that 
'there is significant support in our traditions and history for the view 
approving suicide or attempted suicide.'95 If Judge Kaufman is right about 
this (though I doubt that he is), his own opinion makes plain that such 
historical support was not limited to suicide by those whose quality of life 
was significantly impaired by an objective medical condition. Thus, in a 
passage that Judge Kaufman quotes, Alfred Alvarez observes: 
According to Justinian's Digest suicide of a private citizen [during Roman 
times] was not punishable if it was caused by 'impatience of pain or sickness, 
or by another cause,' or by weariness of life . .. lunacy, or fear of dishonor. 
Since this covered every rational cause, all that was left was the utterly 
irrational suicide 'without cause,' and that was punishable ... 96 
In the course of his opinion, Judge Kaufman sets forth and rejects an 
argument I made in a recent article- that the social sanctioning of 'rational' 
suicide and assisted suicide is likely to lead to an increase in 'irrational' (or 
coerced or 'manipulated') suicide and assisted suicide.97 He dismisses this 
argument on the ground that I did not provide any support for it. 'Couldn't 
one as effectively claim,' asks Kaufman, 'that by drawing a clear legal line 
between rational suicide and irrational suicide, the stigma of committing 
irrational suicide would increase?'98 
Is this line of reasoning persuasive? Does it find any support in our recent 
experience with the 'right to die'? Until the recent legal assault on laws 
prohibiting assisted suicide, many of us thought we had drawn a fairly clear 
legal line - between the refusal or rejection of life-sustaining medical 
treatment and the active intervention of another to promote or to bring about 
death. So far as I know, however, nobody has suggested that drawing such a 
line has increased the stigma of assisted suicide or active voluntary euthanasia. 
Quite the contrary. At this very moment the firmly established right to refuse 
or to withdraw medical treatment is being used as a lever- as an argument for 
expanding the 'right to die' to include assisted suicide and active voluntary 
euthanasia as wel1.99 
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Does Judge Kaufman (or anybody else for that matter) really believe that 
affording constitutional protection to one form of 'rational' suicide and 
assisted suicide will increase the stigma attaching to 'irrational' suicide? (Or 
the stigma associated with other forms of 'rational' suicide?) 
In writing the article Judge Kaufman quotes from, I relied heavily on the 
studies of geriatric psychiatrists (who work with suicidal people every day) 
and suicidologists (who perform 'psychological autopsies' of people who 
commit suicide). They report that a suicide rarely occurs in the absence of a 
major psychiatric disorder and that this observation is equally true in suicides 
among the elderly. 100 More significant for our purposes, these experts 
underscore the inability of depressed persons to recognize the severity of their 
own symptoms and the failure of primary physicians to detect major 
depression, especially in elderly patients.101 
'Ageism'- the prejudices and stereotypes applied to the elderly solely on 
the basis of their age- may manifest itself in a failure to recognize treatable 
depression, the view that an elderly person's desire to commit suicide is more 
'rational' than a younger person's would be, or, more generally, the attitude 
that the elder has every reason to be depressed. 102 As one authority has 
pointed out: 'Although we shrink from the idea of elderly suicide and 
euthanasia, we encourage it by our neglect and indifference.' 103 As another 
commentator has observed: 
Suicidal persons are succumbing to what they experience as an overpowering 
and unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease living. This sense of 
coercion takes many familiar forms: fear, isolation, abuse, uselessness, and so 
on.1o4 
Is it not fair to assume, as I do, that these pressures will intensify in a society 
that sanctions assisted suicide (and thereby suicide as well)? Is it not fair to 
assume that once assisted suicide is a lawful alternative and people are 'doing 
it' and free to talk about it, more people, especially the sick and the old and 
the vulnerable, will see this as the unselfish course to take- a tempting way to 
spare both oneself and one's family the burdens of serious illness and/or 
advanced age? 
Of course, I cannot prove that in a suicide-permissive society a substantial 
number of people who otherwise would not have pursued this route will be 
encouraged or pressured or 'manipulated' into choosing death by suicide or 
assisted suicide.105 But then Judge Kaufman offers no support for his view 
that if a line were not drawn 'requir[ing] the presence of objective medical 
findings, the possibility that irrational suicide would increase is too great.' 106 
If a judge can deny constitutional protection to some forms of 'rational' 
assisted suicide out of concern that if he did not do so 'irrational' assisted 
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suicide might get out of hand, why can a legislature not prohibit all forms of 
'rational' assisted suicide on the same ground? If a judge may give weight to 
the writings of philosophers in arriving at his conclusions about the 
'rationality' of suicide (Judge Kaufman quotes philosopher Richard Brandt 
six times, three times at considerable length), why can a legislature not rely on 
the studies and published findings of suicidologists and geriatric psychiatrists 
to reach a different conclusion? 
After all, as one commentator said (and I am happy to report that he is a 
philosopher): 
If philosophers have something to say to the law, so also has the law something 
to say to philosophers. Attention to the working, or the possible working, of 
any institution or principle may well give us insight into weaknesses which 
remain concealed so long as it is posed in sufficiently abstract terms. 107 
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
When I first wrote about this subject, thirty-six years ago, the chance that any 
state would legalize active voluntary euthanasia seemed minuscule and the 
possibility that any court would find the right of active voluntary euthanasia 
protected by the Due Process Clause seemed so remote as to be almost 
inconceivable. Not any more. 
Before this decade ends I believe there is (a) a strong probability that at 
least several states will decriminalize active voluntary euthanasia (no doubt 
under the euphemistic label 'aid-in-dying'); and (b) a distinct possibility that 
at least several appellate courts will announce a state or federal constitutional 
right to active voluntary euthanasia. I continue to believe the US Supreme 
Court will not discover or recognize such a right, but the possibility that it 
may can no longer be disregarded. 
What we cannot do in one step- perhaps even think about doing- we can 
often do in two or three or four. The modern history of our activities and 
beliefs about the law and ethics of death and dying is a good illustration- it is 
'a history of lost distinctions of former significance'108 (e.g. 'extraordinary 
means' versus 'ordinary means,' the respirator versus the feeding tube). 
My colleague Carl Schneider has called this step-by-step process 'a 
psychological aspect of slippery slopes': They work partly by 'domesticating 
one idea' (say, disconnecting the respirator) and thus making its nearest 
neighbor (terminating 'artificial' feeding) 'seem less extreme and unthinkable.'109 
What many used to call 'negative' or 'passive' euthanasia has become a fait 
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accompli in modern medicine. The next sequence of events is likely to be 
physician-assisted suicide for (a) the terminally ill, (b) those with an 'objective 
medical condition' that significantly diminishes the quality of life, and (c) 
those whose wish to die is 'objectively reasonable.' If so, as this progression 
unfolds, active voluntary euthanasia will become more thinkable, more 
tenable and more supportable. 
Proponents of an expansive 'right to die' have had considerable success in 
overcoming resistance step by step, blotting out one distinction after another. 
And there is no reason to think that this process will come to a halt. One 
important distinction remains - and it is not the distinction between assisted 
suicide and active voluntary euthanasia. As I have tried to show, this 
distinction is too thin to endure for very long. Indeed, even now, it is a 
distinction that the media, the public and even many commentators on the 
subject are either unable or unwilling to take seriously. 
The one formidable distinction that remains is the one that is presently 
under attack - 'the historic divide'110 between the termination of medical 
treatment and the active intervention of another to promote or to bring about 
death. If opponents of active voluntary euthanasia are unable to defend the 
bridge spanning this divide, they will have lost the war. For if this bridge falls, 
the flimsy bridge between assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia 
seems sure to follow. 
AFTERWORD 
In April 1994 I finished my chapter and sent it to the editor of this collection 
for publication. But the last eight months of 1994 turned out to be an 
extraordinarily eventful time for those interested in the law, politics and 
ethics of assisted suicide. 
Some may regard the Oregon voters' approval on 8 November of a 
measure (Ballot Measure 16) authorizing physicians, under certain conditions, 
to prescribe lethal medication for competent, terminally ill adults who 
request it'11 as the most significant event of 1994. I think not. 
After losing two hard-fought campaigns by fairly close votes in the states of 
Washington (1991) and California (1992), 112 proponents of assisted suicide 
were bound to prevail in some state sooner or later. Unlike the proposals 
which failed earlier, the Oregon measure requires that medication prescribed 
under the Act be self-administered.113 Moreover, as discussed earlier, writing 
a prescription for a lethal medication that a patient might take to end her life 
is a relatively low level of assistance. 114 
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It is not at all clear what bearing, if any, the Oregon vote has on the 
question of whether there is a constitutional right or liberty to assisted 
suicide. It may even work against the establishment of such a right or liberty. 
For one thing, the Oregon vote demonstrates again that when American 
voters actually cast their ballots, they are closely divided on the issue: The 
more extensive Washington and California proposals failed by a 54 percent to 
46 percent vote; the considerably more limited Oregon proposal barely 
passed by a 51 percent to 49 percent margin. Moreover, the fact that 
proponents of assisted suicide finally gained a victory in Oregon could 
conceivably lead a Justice who favors some form of physician-assisted suicide 
as a matter of public policy to decline to constitutionalize the area. He or she 
might do so for the reason that judicial intervention at this time might halt a 
political process that is viewed as moving in the right direction and prolong 
divisiveness and defer stable settlement of the issue. 115 
More noteworthy in 1994, I think, than the approval of the Oregon 
measure were events that occurred in the courthouse of Seattle, Washington, 
and the state of Michigan. 
On 2 May a jury acquitted Dr Jack Kevorkian of violating Michigan's 
prohibition against assisted suicide. Although some hailed the acquittal as 
proof that no jury would ever convict Kevorkian, I believe (on the basis of the 
jury's requests to re-examine certain evidence and various jurors' post-verdict 
statements to the press) that the outcome turned more on geography and 
semantics than it did on jury nullification. 116 
The very next day, the Chief Judge of the US District Court in Seattle, 
Washington, Barbara Rothstein, became the first federal judge to strike down 
a statute outlawing assisted suicide on Fourteenth Amendment due process 
grounds. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 she invalidated a 
Washington state law prohibiting assisted suicide insofar as it placed an 
undue burden on competent, terminally ill adults who seek physician-assisted 
suicide. 
Judge Rothstein deemed a terminally ill person's right to choose 
physician-assisted suicide no less intimate or personal a decision and no less 
deserving of constitutional protection than a pregnant woman's right to 
choose abortion. In the main Judge Rothstein adopted the reasoning of the 
Michigan Civil Liberties Union as set forth in Robert Sedler's article. 118 Judge 
Rothstein made no more effort than did Professor Sedler to reconcile her 
expansive reading of the abortion cases with Bowers v. Hardwick, a case that 
upheld a ban against consensual sodomy as applied to homosexuals. 119 She, 
too, ignored the case entirely. 
The state of Washington argued, inter alia, that a line had been drawn-
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and should be maintained - between the termination of life-sustaining 
medical treatment and active intervention to promote or to bring about 
death. But Judge Rothstein was unmoved. From a constitutional perspective, 
she concluded, there is no meaningful distinction between the right to refuse 
or to withdraw medical treatment, a course of action that results in death, 
and the right of a competent, terminally ill person to achieve the same end by 
using drugs prescribed or provided by a physician. 
Only one other American Court, a Michigan trial court, had ever held that 
there is a constitutional right to assisted suicide.120 But on 10 May the 
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that court on this point. 121 A 2-1 
majority rejected the argument that the right to suicide or suicide assistance is 
a 'logical extension of [the] catalog of rights' protected by the 'guarantee of 
personal privacy.'122 Seven months later, in People v. Kevorkian123 and 
Hobbins v. Attorney General/24 a 5-2 majority of the Michigan Supreme 
Court announced its agreement with the Court of Appeals on this point, 
explicitly rejecting the analysis utilized in Compassion in Dying: 
The advocates of assisted suicide ask us to adopt the reasoning of a recent 
federal decision that invalidated the State of Washington's criminal prohibition 
against assisted suicide [referring to Compassion in Dying] ... We disagree 
with the federal court that either Cruzan or [Planned Parenthood v.] Casey 
preordains that the Supreme Court would find that any persons, including the 
terminally ill, have a liberty interest in suicide that is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Those who assert such a right misapprehend the 
nature of the holdings in those cases. 
In Cruzan, the Court was able to 'assume' a protected liberty interest in the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment because it was able to 
distinguish between acts that artificially sustain life and acts that artificially 
curtail life. Although some suggest that this is a distinction without constitutional 
significance - a meaningless exercise in semantic gymnastics - the Cruzan 
majority disagreed and so do we ... 
. . . [W]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal or 
cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its 
course, unencumbered by contrived intervention ... 
. . . [P]ersons who opt to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment are 
not, in effect, committing suicide. There is a difference between choosing a 
natural death summoned by an uninvited illness or calamity, and deliberately 
seeking to terminate one's life by resorting to death-inducing measures 
unrelated to the natural process of dying . 
. . . In Casey, the Court was not directly concerned with the establishment 
of a new right, but rather with whether the Court should retreat from the right 
previously recognized in Roe v. Wade. In declining to overrule Roe, and 
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relying heavily on the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court emphasized that 
abortion cases are unique ... 
(T]he right to commit suicide is neither implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty nor deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. It would be an 
impermissibly radical departure from existing tradition, and from the 
principles that underlie that tradition, to declare that there is such a 
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. 125 
The fact that within the space of seven months a federal district court and a 
state supreme court reached opposite conclusions as to whether one has a 
constitutionally protected 'right' or 'liberty' to obtain a person's assistance in 
committing suicide indicates that American courts may disagree about this 
issue for the next several years- until it is decided by the US Supreme Court. 
But on 25 May 1994 an event occurred that is likely to have a significant 
impact on how this issue is ultimately resolved. That day the 24-member New 
York State Task Force on Life and the Law issued a 181-page report 
unanimously rejecting proposals to legalize assisted suicide and voluntary 
active euthanasia.'26 
The Task Force is an influential body whose previous legislative proposals 
had reflected deep respect for individual autonomy. (Seven years earlier this 
same group had taken the position, at a time when the issue was still hotly 
disputed, that the right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment 
includes the right to withhold and withdraw artificial nutrition and 
hydration.127) But in 1994 the Task Force balked at crossing 'the historic divide': 
In light of the pervasive failure of our health care system to treat pain and 
diagnose and treat depression, legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia 
would be profoundly dangerous for many individuals who are ill and 
vulnerable. The risks would be most severe for those who are elderly, poor, 
socially disadvantaged, or without access to good medical care. 128 
The Task Force recognized that 'one can posit "ideal" cases in which all 
the recommended safeguards [for assisted suicide] would be satisfied: 
patients would be screened for depression and offered treatment, effective 
pain medication would be available, and all patients would have a supportive, 
committed family and doctor. ' 129 But 
the reality of existing medical practice in doctors' offices and hospitals across 
the state generally cannot match these expectations, however any guidelines or 
safeguards might be framed. These realities render legislation to legalize 
assisted suicide and euthanasia vulnerable to error and abuse for all members 
of society, not only for those who are disadvantaged ... Constructing an 
ideal or 'good' case is not sufficient for public policy, if it bears little relation to 
prevalent medical practice. 130 
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In light of the fact that Task Force members considered the legalization of 
assisted suicide and euthanasia from different backgrounds and perspectives, 
the unanimity of their recommendation that the total prohibition against 
these practices should remain intact is surprising and, I believe, quite 
significant. Although some of the Task Force members were of the view that 
assisted suicide and euthanasia are inherently wrong, others were not. 131 
Indeed, members of this second group believed that in appropriate circumstances 
assisting a patient to commit suicide 'would manifest a physician's commitment 
and duty to his or her patient.'132 Nonetheless, these members concluded that 
legalizing assisted suicide 'would be unwise and dangerous public policy.' 133 
They regarded 'the consequences of quietly tolerating assisted suicide as a 
private act of agreement between two individuals in extreme cases as 
profoundly different'134 from the consequences of legalizing the activity: 
In addition to regulating and restraining behavior, our laws also serve a highly 
symbolic function ... The legal prohibition, while not uniformly honored, 
preserves the gravity o{conduct to assist suicide and prevents abuse ... 
By curtailing the autonomy of patients in a very small number of cases when 
assisted suicide is a compelling and justifiable response [the legal prohibition] 
preserves the autonomy and well-being of many others. It also prevents the 
widespread abuses that would be likely to occur if assisted suicide were 
legalized. 135 
As might be expected from the foregoing discussion of its report, the Task 
Force resoundingly rejected the view that one has a 'constitutional right' to 
commit suicide or to obtain suicide assistance. In sharp contrast to the 
position taken by Judge Rothstein in the Compassion in Dying case, the Task 
Force drew 'a clear line' for constitutional purposes, as well as for public 
policy and medical practice, 'between forgoing medical interventions and 
assistance to commit suicide or euthanasia.'136 
Although Judge Rothstein had read the 'right to die' cases as establishing a 
broad right to determine the timing and manner of one's death, the Task 
Force maintained that 'these cases stand for the more limited proposition that 
individuals have a right to resist bodily intrusions, and to preserve the 
possibility of dying a natural death.'137 The report emphasized that 'the 
imposition of life-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will 
requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity and, in some cases, the use of 
physical restraints, both of which are flatly inconsistent with society's basic 
conception of personal dignity. ' 138 lt is this right against intrusion, maintained 
the Task Force '-not a general right to control the timing and manner of 
death- that forms the basis of the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment.'139 Restrictions on suicide, on the other hand, 'entail no such 
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intrusions, but simply prevent individuals from intervening in the natural 
process of dying. ' 140 
Although the Task Force's analysis of the 'right to die' cases may influence 
some members of the Supreme Court, this analysis constitutes only a small 
part of the report and the Justices are likely to feel this is the one aspect of the 
problem about which they need the least help. They are more likely to be 
impressed by the tone, quality, depth and documentation of the Task Force's 
findings, reasoning and public policy arguments. 
The Court will likely be affected by the Task Force's thoughtful discussion 
of the 'state of vulnerability' produced by serious illness; the uncertainty in 
estimating a patient's life expectancy and the fallibility of medical practice 
generally; the severe shortcomings of current pain relief practices and 
palliative care; the very small number of individuals who make an informed, 
competent choice to die by suicide (particularly if appropriate pain relief and 
supportive care are provided) and who cannot achieve their goal without 
another person's assistance; the close link between assisted suicide and active 
voluntary euthanasia; the elasticity and instability of the criteria now 
proposed as safeguards if and when assisted suicide and euthanasia are 
integrated into medical practice (for example, once euthanasia becomes 'an 
accepted "therapy"' there is a distinct possibility that patients incapable of 
consenting will, in certain respects, 'seem the "best" candidates for the 
practice'); and the recognition that assisted suicide and euthanasia 'will be 
practiced through the prism of social inequality and prejudice that characterizes 
the delivery of services in all segments of society, including health care.'141 
To be sure, any American legislature remains free to reject the Task Force 
report as a matter of public policy. But how can it be said that a legislature 
that is impressed by the same nonreligious arguments against assisted suicide 
that influenced the Task Force and arrives at the same conclusions the Task 
Force did has acted unconstitutionally? 
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